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Scholarly and public policy accounts of temporary labour migration in Southeast Asia 
emphasize the manifold problems associated with attempts to regulate the flows of 
so-called 'undocumented' migrant workers throughout the region. Part of the difficulty 
in managing the 'illegal' movement of labour migrants is that categories used by 
receiving countries such as 'documented' and 'undocumented' or 'regular' and 'irregular' 
are extremely fluid and temporary labour migrants can move between them rapidly 
(Grewcock 2003). Migrants who pass through legal channels may also confront a 
range of practices in their home countries, such as falsified or fake documents, that blur 
the distinction between legal and illegal recruitment and deployment (Skeldon 2000).  
While much attention has been paid to the role of people smugglers and traffickers 
in illegal border crossings, the part played by the state has been given less 
consideration. And yet, the state is clearly involved in the illegal practices 
associated with international temporary labour migration in all its forms. As 
Willem van Schendel (2005:54) has argued 'the image of states as simply reactive, 
responding to the growth of clandestine transnational flows, is misleading because 
it understates the degrees to which states actually structure, condition, produce, and 
enable clandestine border crossings'. Labour migrants weave their way in and out of 
intersecting spheres of legality and illegality as they negotiate the complex nature of 
the labour migration regimes that sending and host countries construct (Ford 2007). 
This chapter explores the state's role in semi-legal migration flows through Tanjung 
Pinang, the capital city of the province of Kepulauan Riau (the Riau Islands) in the 
borderlands between Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia.1 In the Riau Islands, local 
officials play a pivotal role in facilitating the flow of temporary labour migrants 
across the border. They collaborate with a range of other actors involved in the labour 
migration process, including official and unofficial labour recruitment agents; local 
brokers who act as middle-men between agents, officials and prospective migrants; and 
numerous other private entrepreneurs who provide specialized services, such as those 
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running 'passport bureaus'. While some of these actors are involved in legal businesses, 
others operate illegally but with local government sanction. Together they are part of an 
alternative labour migration system that sits alongside the official process, and which has 
both legal and illegal aspects to its operation. 
As Riau Islanders are quick to observe, in the islands 'illegal doesn't mean that labour 
migrants travel through the pelabuhan tikus [illegal ports, lit. rat ports]. They have 
passports'.2 As this comment suggests, locals make a distinction between 'documented but 
illegal' labour migrants who travel with authentic documents issued by the local 
immigration office, but obtained or used illegally, and 'undocumented illegal' migrants 
who use the services of smugglers to slip across the border undetected. The documents the 
first group of migrants carry are described in Indonesian as being 'real but fake' (asli tapi 
palsu, aspal), reflecting the fact that they are genuine documents obtained without going 
through all the processes that define formally sanctioned channels of temporary labour 
migration. We describe this 'grey' labour migration, where workers cross Indonesia's borders 
with real passports, and sometimes work permits, obtained with real or fake documents 
obtained through irregular channels at the point of origin, transit or departure - as the aspal 
route. 
The actions of officials involved in the aspal route are clearly corrupt. They provide identity 
cards, official passports or even work permits to official and unofficial labour recruiters 
and other middle-men in return for payments in cash or in-kind services or as favours for 
friends or relatives. In doing so, they knowingly circumvent existing central government 
population laws and the policies and procedures of the national labour export program. 
However, it would be a mistake to view their behaviour solely as a matter of corruption 
motivated by personal gain or the desire to influence local politics. While in many cases 
their actions are linked to attempts to shore up their local political power bases or simply 
to supplement meagre wages, they are also part of a local community-sanctioned response 
to international migration flows through the islands. Many local people view these 
practices as a necessary and obvious solution to the presence in the islands of large 
numbers of intending labour migrants. The licitness of these illegal practices within the 
community has important implications for the way in which the aspal system operates. 
Significantly, it means that forms of criminality often associated with corruption in 
Indonesia (such as the presence of strongmen or violent coercion) are typically absent in 
much of the grey labour migration process. 
This chapter traces the different practices and motivations associated with the aspal 
route in order to shed light on the nature of state illegality in Indonesia. In doing so, it 
seeks to go beyond simply describing modes of corruption to also examine the multiple 
meanings attached to the provision of 'real but fake' documents by the range of actors 
involved in the labour migration process. The aspal system is not unique to the Riau Islands 
or other transit areas; it is also found in provinces of origin and major urban centres like 
Jakarta. However, these practices become magnified in the periphery because of the vast 
                                                          
2 Interview with NGO activist, December 2006. 
flows of migrants into the transit provinces and across the border. Our concern with the 
transit provinces in general - and the Riau Islands in particular- also reflects an 
increasing awareness that accounts written from the perspective of the periphery offer 
alternative accounts of state illegality (McCarthy 2002; Wadley and Eilenberg 2005; 
McCarthy 2007a). Since borders act as 'pivots' (Van Schendel 2005) between territorial 
states and transnational flows, attention to the regulatory processes involved in 
managing labour migration flows in transit provinces offers both a corrective to state-
centric understandings of migration and important insights into the state's involvement in 
irregular migration practices. 
Indonesia’s national labour migration system 
The Indonesian state's management of temporary labour migration from Indonesia has 
attracted intense scrutiny over the last three decades as the numbers of Indonesians 
seeking work overseas continues to grow. Successive governments have been subject to 
sustained critiques which focus on their negligence in managing the formal process of 
labour migration, and emphasize the corrupt and inadequate structures of the system and 
their implications for individual migrant workers (see for example Indonesian migrant 
workers 2002; Human Rights Watch 2004, 2005:13-5). Less understood are those migrants 
who follow the aspal route or bypass the system altogether. Yet these migrants constitute a 
significant proportion of migrant flows to regional destinations. According to the 
government's own estimates, between 200,000 and 300,000 Indonesians working in 
Malaysia alone have bypassed the official system.3 
Migrants who circumvent the official system are motivated to do so because of the very 
complicated processes set out under Law no. 39/2004 on the Placement and Protection of 
Indonesian Workers Overseas, a law ostensibly designed to improve the placement and 
protection of Indonesian migrant workers. Under the law, the central government - through 
the National Agency for the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers 
(Badan Nasional Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia, BNP2TKI) - 
is responsible for 'regulating, guiding, carrying out and over-seeing the placement and 
protection of Indonesian workers overseas' (Law no. 39/2004, Article 5) in 
collaboration with local government and other agencies. In order to be considered 
'legal' under this framework, intending labour migrants must first register with the 
responsible local labour office, assumed- although not stated -to be in the province of 
origin. Workers are recruited from this pool by officially sanctioned recruitment agents. 
Agents must be legally constituted companies in possession of a Migrant Worker 
Placement Licence (Surat Izin Pelaksana Penempatan TKI, SIP) issued by the Department 
of Manpower and Transmigration, a recruitment agreement, a job order and a draft 
contract from an agent or individual in a receiving country. Workers who are selected by 
the recruitment agent then undergo mental and physical health checks organized by the 
Department of Health, receive training and undergo an assessment of their work-related 
                                                          
3 Moh, Jumhur Hidayat, head of the National Agency for the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant 
Workers, cited in Waspada Online. See ‘Indonesia asks Malaysia not to issue working visa to individual 
applicants’, Waspada Online 14-9-2008. 
competencies. The agent organizes insurance, an official migrant worker passport 
(which has only 24 pages rather than the normal 36 or 48), visas and payment of the 
US$15 fee levied by the government on intending migrant workers. 
During the processing phase, intending migrant workers are housed in barracks. 
Immediately prior to departure, they go through a final training process and receive a 
copy of their employment contract and their migrant worker identity card (Kartu 
Tenaga Kerja Luar Negeri, KTKLN), which re- places their standard identity card 
whilst overseas. This card can be issued by a representative of the centrally controlled 
migrant labour placement office in the province of origin or at the point of embarkation. 
Once they have their migrant worker identity card, intending labour migrants can be 
issued with a letter of exemption, which removes the obligation to pay the exit tax 
(fiskal luar negeri) levied on Indonesians travelling abroad. Finally, recruitment agencies 
are required to report all successful placements to the local manpower office (Law no. 
39/2004, Article 54). At each stage of the official reruitment process, prospective labour 
migrants are faced with another round of paperwork and fees they must pay. 
Significantly, the labour recruitment process requires intending migrant workers to 
remain in holding centres for between one and three months while they wait to be 
placed overseas.4 The complexities of the official process, combined with the time and 
costs involved have created ample opportunities for rent-seeking within the formal system 
and a motivation for the establishment of an alternative route. 
Migration through the transit provinces 
Many of the studies that seek to examine the nexus between migration and state illegality 
in Indonesia focus on the dedicated terminal for returning migrant workers at Jakarta's 
Soekarno-Hatta airport, Terminal 3.5 As Rachel Silvey (2007) argues, a close study of 
processes within Terminal 3 demonstrates not only the complicated role of the state in 
migration but also the link between state-sanctioned processes and illegality. These illegal 
state practices may extend beyond simply 'breaking the law' to include bureaucratic 
incompetence, red-tape, patronage and lack of responsiveness. 
Much less studied sites for examining illegal state practices in regard to the regulation of 
temporary labour migration are the transit provinces in Sumatra and Kalimantan through 
which labour migrants pass on their way to Singapore and Malaysia (Ford 2006). One such 
transit province is Kepulauan Riau, the province which incorporates the islands that lie to 
the east of mainland Sumatra. The geographical proximity of the Riau Islands to 
Indonesia's neighbours serves as a magnet both for internal labour migrants and for 
significant flows of regular and irregular labour migrants across the border.6 International 
                                                          
4 Under earlier regulations they could be kept in a holding centre for up to 150 days. The description that 
follows held true at the time of writing, but it should be noted that the system is continually changing. 
5 See for example Surtces 2003; Rudnyckyj 2004; Silvey 2007. Similar terminals exist in Surabaya and Solo. 
6 Lyons and Ford 2007. According to the 2000 census, Singapore's 612,200 foreign workers constitute 29.2% 
of the total workforce (Singapore Department of Statistics 2000). About 500,000 of these workers are 
considered unskilled or low-skilled and Indonesians are strongly represented in low-skilled service-sector 
jobs and on commercial ships based in Singapore. In 2006, the total number of employed persons in Malaysia 
was around 10.6 million (Government of Malaysia 2007). As of the end of June 2006, there were 1.84 
migrants pass through many ports in the islands, including the town of Tanjung Pinang, 
which has long been considered a strategic point from which to travel illegally to 
Singapore and Malaysia (Sobary 1987:5). The Riau Islands are also one of the nearest 
points for repatriation of large numbers of workers whose contracts have ended and 
undocumented migrants who have been deported from Malaysia. Tanjung Pinang alone 
receives hundreds of deportees almost every week. In 2006, 16,805 Indonesians passed 
through the Tanjung Pinang holding centre, which can accommodate up to 600 people at 
a time.7 Deportees regularly arrive at the centre on a Thursday and stay a maximum of 
three nights before being returned by the local government to their provinces of origin.8 
A detailed report compiled by the Indonesian Auditor General identifies a whole series 
of very serious problems, including endemic corruption, in its review of the labour 
migration process in Mainland Riau and the Riau Islands. The report identified a number 
of problems in the recruitment and deployment process including incomplete 
documentation, 9 and a failure to pass on over Rp one billion in charges levied on 
intending migrant workers to the Indonesian Migrant Worker Placement Service Centre 
(Balai Pelayanan dan Penempatan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia, BP2TKI) (Badan Pemeriksa 
Keuangan Republik Indonesia 2006:63-92). The report also identified a mismatch 
between the number of migrant workers registered with Pekanbaru office of the BP2TKI, 
which has responsibility for overseeing migrant workers in the Riau Islands, and the 
numbers of workers that claim exit tax-free status (bebas fiscal luar negeri).10 The 
Auditor General found that a significant number of exit tax exemptions were issued to 
workers who had not followed the mandated procedure. Of the 151,762 intending 
labour migrants who received exit tax exemption letters in Mainland Riau or the Riau 
Islands in 2004-2005, 112,444 were issued tax exemption letters in the islands, yet 
only 43,989 exemptions were recorded with the BP2TKI (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan 
Republik Indonesia 2006:87-8). 
Our research shows that similar inconsistencies are evident at the local level. In 2006, 
1,910 migrant workers left Tanjung Pinang on official migrant worker passports, only 310 
of whom were issued exit tax exemption letters by the Department of Manpower's 
Tanjung Pinang office.11 These figures suggest that instead of applying for their tax 
                                                          
million registered foreign workers in Malaysia, primarily in manufacturing, services and agriculture. 64.7% of 
these registered foreign workers were from Indonesia (Ministry of Finance Malaysia 2007). 
7 Details of this centre's operation can be found in Dnftnr kcdalnngan (2006a, b, c). 
8 Interview with NGO worker in Tanjung Pinang, November 2006. Central government contributions to the 
local budget of major transit areas include an allowance for the provision of these services. 
9 During the course of the pre-departure process, intending migrants must produce or obtain a standard 
identity card, school records and birth certificate, and marriage certificate where relevant; a letter of 
permission from their spouse, parents or guardian; a certificate of their work-related competencies; a 
certificate of physical and mental health; u work visa; a work placement contract; a work contract and a 
migrant worker identity card (Law no. 39/2004, Article 51). 
10 This number does not include those with local papers, since Riau Islanders are exempt from the exit 
tax. 
11 Dajlar mlo11 2006; Dajlar P]TK11006. 
 
exemption letters from the local BP2TKI representative as required under Law no. 
39/2004, large numbers of otherwise regular labour migrants leave Indonesia through the 
islands using aspal tax exemption letters obtained from local government agencies in the 
islands. In other words, they leave with authentic and appropriate documents obtained via 
irregular means. Our interview data and local statistics indicate that irregularities in the 
issuance of tax exemption letters are not the only example of aspal practices. For example, 
many labour migrants leave the islands without registering with BP2TKI at all. In 2006 
alone, an estimated 2,000 migrant workers passed through the local port monthly on their 
way to Singapore or Malaysia despite the fact that fewer than 700 applications for 
placement were approved in each month.12 
The Auditor General's report attributes such irregularities to understaffing, a lack of 
coordination between different agencies and between local governments in sending and 
receiving provinces. However, central government agencies are well aware of the 
involvement of local government authorities in the aspal route, a situation that it has 
sought to redress by establishing a dedicated team for the prevention of departures that 
might be designated as being 'non-procedural' according to Ministerial Decision no. KEP-
14/MEN/1/2005. These ongoing efforts have had limited success in stemming the practice 
of issuing 'real but fake' documents, but for large numbers of  labour migrants, the aspal 
system continues to be the most efficient way of crossing the border and seeking work  
abroad since it offers them  the hope of becoming  'documented'  workers  in  the  
receiving  country  without  the  costs  and  red-tape associated with formal system.13 For 
many of the public officials responsible for issuing documents required in the labour 
migration process,  the rewards - but also the logic - of the aspal route is self-evident in a 
context where local conditions are not taken into account in national-level decision 
making about Indonesia's labour export program. 
Travelling the aspal route 
Intending labour migrants who transit in the town of Tanjung Pinang generally seek 
assistance from one of three kinds of migration agents. The first group consists of 
companies that are officially registered with the BNP2TKI and that follow official 
procedures. As of November 2005, there were 24 registered agents in Tanjung Pinang, 
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countries accepting only those migrant workers who have followed the requirements of Law no. 
39/2004, which specifies that workers can only be recruited by officially approved recruitment agents 
based in Indonesia. Recruitment by an Indonesian or foreign sponsor is explicitly forbidden (see 
Explanatory notes for Article 37, Law no. 39/2004). However, attempts by the Indonesian government 
in collaboration with the governments of major receiving countries to police this system have not been 
particularly successful. The central government has repeatedly tried to deal with the problem of direct 
recruitment by foreign agents or employers, most recently sending a diplomatic note to the Malaysian 
authorities, asking them not to issue working visas to individual applicants. See 'Indonesia asks 
Malaysia not to issue working visa to individual applicants', Waspada Online 14-9-2008. 
 
 
six of which had their head office in the town (Bad an Pemeriksa Keuangan Republik 
Indonesia 2006:77). The second group of agents deliver workers with no papers to 
Malaysia and Singapore by boat (a practice typically referred to as 'people smuggling'). 
The third group consists of agents, either officially registered companies or individuals, 
that use local contacts to organize local identity cards and passports for workers outside 
the formal system either exclusively or in addition to engaging in that formal system. This 
third group of agents is the group associated with the aspal route.14 
The aspal route begins when individuals are convinced or decide to migrate for work 
without registering with the local Manpower Office in their district of origin. This may 
happen because the intending labour migrant has insufficient knowledge about the formal 
procedures or because an acquaint lance, relative or local middle-man (calo) suggests that 
the aspal route is a better option for them. These workers are brought by either middle-
men or employees of agents based in Kepulauan Riau directly to the islands. The agent, 
which might be a legally registered company or an individual, then obtains a local 
identity card from his or her collaborators in the local administrative office under the 
intending worker's real name or a pseudonym in a process that can take as little as a 
day. In 2006 the going rate for what is referred to locally as a seasonal identity card 
('KTP musiman') was Rp 125,000. Once a local identity card is in hand, the would-be 
migrant can then obtain a standard passport through regular means or more quickly 
through the agents' contacts in the local office of the Immigration Department. The fact 
that they are obtained using a local identity card means that their bearers can benefit 
from the province's exit tax-free status. 
Although these passports are different from those issued to intending labour migrants 
by the Indonesian authorities, they are official travel documents that may be 
recognized by overseas governments issuing work visas. This means that a prospective 
labour migrant can use the passport to exit Indonesia and legally enter a neighbouring 
country. Although migrant workers are required by Indonesian authorities to hold a 
labour migration passport (paspor TKI), Indonesian citizens leaving Indonesia are 
unlikely to be more than summarily quizzed about the purpose of their travel when they 
pass through an Indonesian immigration checkpoint on a standard passport. Some of 
these migrants enter Singapore and Malaysia as 'tourists' on visitor's passes and then 
convert their visas to work permits with the assistance of a local labour placement agent. 
Others may be issued with work permits on arrival on the basis of aspal migrant labour 
passports issued at the point of departure. Some are turned back as potential 'illegal' 
workers, but many more pass through undeterred.15 
                                                          
14 Falsification of identity and many of the other aspects of the aspnl route  described  here  are also 
found within the formal labour migration system. 
15 Some of those who enter on a visitor's pass may work illegally. Indonesia has signed a number of MOUs 
on the labour migration process with the governments of Singapore and Malaysia. These have been 
partially successful in addressing anomalies in the immigration regimes governing foreign workers. For 
example, Singapore has introduced a 'single gale policy' for the recruitment of domestic workers. 
The 'passport bureaus' that have developed to service the aspal route are an integral 
part of this system. An owner-operator of one such passport bureau, run from a shop-
house in the town of Tanjung Uban, about an hour from Tanjung Pinang, specialized in 
providing passports for domestic workers planning to go to Malaysia and Singapore. 
Although he also provided passports for accredited labour agents, the vast majority of 
the applications he processed were for migrant workers intending to leave without 
fulfilling all the requirements of the official labour migration process. Between 2001 
and 2003, this bureau agent 'processed' several hundred passport applications per day. 
He obtained the 'real' passports supplied by his bureau through a contact in the local 
immigration office who was able to supply him with official passports using local 
identity cards supplied to him by his clients. Once the bureau agent received the 
passports, he passed them on to a range of other actors involved in the labour migration 
process. His clients included accredited labour agents, unofficial labour agents, casual 
labour brokers and sometimes intending labour migrants themselves.16 
It is through bureaus like this that the unofficial labour-sending agents who are the 
mainstays of the aspal route obtain travel documents for their clients. An agent 
interviewed in 2001 was one of a large number of local 'entrepreneurs' engaged in grey 
labour migration.17 He and his wife were not registered with the Department of 
Manpower, nor did they have a legally constituted company. They operated their business 
from their residence in a lower middle-class suburb of Tanjung Pinang, supplying 
domestic workers to a Malaysian contact. The Indonesian agent recruited women from 
local placement agencies in Jakarta that were not registered to supply workers for positions 
overseas. Once the women arrived in Tanjung Pinang, the agent used his contacts in 
local government and the immigration department to obtain local identity cards and 
passports for them. The Indonesian paperwork he provided to the women was recognized 
in West Malaysia, and he used appropriate permits for employment supplied by his 
Malaysian counterpart.18 
Although it is now illegal for Indonesian workers to be deployed by receiving-country 
agents independent of the Indonesian system, these practices persist not least because of 
the many benefits workers derive from travelling the aspal route. As a Tanjung Pinang-
based NGO activist observed, the aspal process is much faster and cheaper than the formal 
process because intending migrant workers get a passport, but do not have to pay for a visa 
(which their employer arranges once they have entered the host country), insurance or a 
medical check-up (mandated as part of the formal labour migration process), or the extra 
                                                          
Before it was introduced, domestic workers leaving Indonesia through alternative channels were not 
necessarily illegal in Singapore (Abdul Rahman 2003:100). 
16 As he was not particularly well-connected, this agent's business declined sharply in 2004 when the central 
government attempted to short-circuit the system by bringing in immigration officials from head office. The 
success of the central initiative was short-lived because the newcomers were quickly socialized into the 
culture of the local office and became integrated into the aspal system. 
17 For a fuller account of this operation and details of women's motivations for using this agent see Ford 2001. 
18 Malaysia's eastern states have a separate immigration system. 
charges associated with obtaining these documents.19 Most importantly, intending migrant 
workers do not have to wait long periods in barracks in Java or elsewhere before 
placement. Nor are they required to return to their province of origin before being 
redeployed. And although the time taken by the aspal process varies according to the 
efficiency of the agent and the fees levied on the worker, it can be remarkably quick. Zain 
Zainuddin, a Malaysian journalist with the daily Harimz Metro, claims that in 2006 workers 
could be deported, organize a new passport in Tanjung Pinang, and be back working in 
Malaysia the same day (Zain 2006). Interviews with grey migration agents in Tanjung 
Pinang and evidence from other transit locations confirm that such rapid processing of 
documents is indeed possible. In Nunukan, for example, illegal agents simply have to 
telephone the immigration department to obtain hundreds of passports within days.20 
What is interesting about the aspal process is not that it exists, since it provides benefits for 
workers in a context where government corruption is taken for granted. As Nengsih - a 
former domestic worker who spent time in a Singapore prison for entering Singapore 
under a false name- reminds us, second or even third identity cards are easily obtainable 
anywhere in Indonesia: 
In Indonesia even if we have been deported from one country it's easy just to 
make another passport and go somewhere else. That's how it is here. Easy. 
There's nothing to stop someone having more than one passport. The 
government can't do anything about it. All we need to do is move from 
Jakarta to Batam and then from Batam to [Tanjung] Pinang. In each place we 
can be a different person. 
What is remarkable, rather, is the high level of institutionalization and public acceptance 
of this alternative system. While it is illegal for temporary labour migrants to leave 
Indonesia without passing through formal labour migration procedures, local agents of the 
state are involved in the setting-up and operation of the aspal route. As a consequence, the 
production of aspal documents has become an established part of the immigration process 
in the transit zone. The aspal route has become such an entrenched part of local life that 
most locals know how the system works and who to contact to obtain the necessary 
paperwork. By contrast, few understand the steps involved in the official process, or could 
explain how or why the aspal system is 'illegal' beyond the fact that it may involve the 
payment of bribes to officials. As Nengsih's comment suggests, the payment of these 
bribes in itself is not regarded as a remarkable act- it is simply the way things get done. 
While the local government officials involved in the aspal system recognize that their acts 
are not strictly legal, they see the grey migration system as a legitimate response to the 
difficulties associated with implementing the national labour migration process. Large 
numbers of prospective international labour migrants arrive in the Riau Islands with the 
hope of crossing the border into Malaysia and Singapore. They travel great distances 
and endure an arduous journey before arriving in the islands. The arrival of these intending 
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20 Personal communication with Riwanto Tirtosudarrno, 14-7-2003. 
migrants in the islands poses an enormous dilemma for the local authorities. Sending 
them back to their provinces of origin to apply through the proper channels for an 
overseas job would not be practical even if the local authorities had the resources or 
wherewithal to do so. Given the large numbers involved, ignoring the problem is also not a 
solution. From the perspective of local government officials and community leaders, then, 
facilitating their migration by issuing 'real but fake' documents is an ideal response. It 
ensures a fast and efficient flow of migrants across the border (thereby mitigating against 
the need to feed and house the incoming migrants); provides a livelihood for members of 
the local community involved in the labour migration process; and affords some protection 
to workers once they are overseas (because they are in possession of 'real' documents). For 
many local officials involved in the provision of aspal documents, the fact that they make 
a side income (penghasilan sampingan) is a taken-for-granted aspect of their work. No one 
involved in the process would expect it to be any different. 
Like many other aspects of state practice in the borderlands, the aspal route is thus at 
least in part a structural response to the intersection between national and local regimes - 
in this case the intersection between a centralized labour migration regime and a local 
immigration regime developed in response to the political economy of this particular 
borderland, characterized by close and easy physical access to neighbouring Singapore 
and Malaysia and the fact that islanders are exempt from the national exit tax. To fully 
comprehend the nature of 'state corruption' in labour migration flows, therefore, we must 
pay attention not only to the ways in which individual claims to licitness intersect with 
state practices, but also to the interstices of such competing regimes. What this points to is a 
need to invoke the concept of scale not only in terms of establishing the importance of the 
borderlands as periphery, but also in relation to the state itself. In particular, we need to 
consider differences (and similarities) in the ways that local, provincial and national level 
governments and officials respond to labour migration flows 
Migration, illegality and the state 
Given the systemic involvement of Indonesian government officials in illegal practices, it 
is not surprising that corruption has emerged as a significant problem in policy making 
and academic research on the Indonesian state (Schulte Nordholt and Van Klinken 
2007b). Indeed, a growing number of detailed studies of the 'webs of political, economic, 
and social exchange' (Migdal 1988:247) in which grassroots politicians, bureaucrats and 
strongmen are involved conclude that corruption is endemic in contemporary Indonesia. 
One of the enduring explanations for widespread corruption in Indonesia is that there exists 
an in-built, structural requirement for the bureaucracy and the military to raise funds to 
support its own activities and pay wages (Mietzner 2008b). As these accounts suggest, in 
such a system officials extract as much 'informal' income as they can. Other accounts 
point to the lack of formal channels for meaningful participation in government decision-
making processes, arguing that this encourages individuals to pursue their interests using 
informal networks built on personal ties (H. Crouch 1975, 1978, 1979; Robison 1981, 
1986). This view, which suggests that corruption is part of an elite-sponsored system to 
shore up power and draw attention away from the regime' s own complicity in illegal 
practices, has fed into more analyses that focus on idea of a 'shadow state' - a concept 
that describes the part of the state that lies outside formal state structures, in which 
political authority is drawn from the ability to control the informal economy (Harriss-White 
2003). 
The literature on the shadow state suggests that while control of the informal economy 
may sometimes depend on the use of actual physical force by strongmen, more often 
stakeholders exert influence through market monopolies, as state actors invite non-state 
actors to join in the shadow state network they build and provide them with protection from 
formal state authority (Erman 2007; Hidayat 2007; Migdal 1988). Those involved in the 
shadow state use formal institutions for private ends, including corruption, collusion and 
forced privatization of state assets. Schulte Nordholt and Van Klinken (2007b:7) argue 
that as a consequence of these practices, the 'boundaries between (legitimate) state violence 
and (illegal) criminality, and between formal institutions and semi-informal criminal 
gangs' become increasingly blurred. Corruption thus provides the 'space collective state 
actors need to build political coalitions with societal partners against perceived rivals' 
(Van Klinken 2008). However, the problem with these accounts of state corruption or 
involvement in illegal activities is that they assume that state actors regard corruption as a 
form of criminal behaviour. 
In contrast to this view, many of those involved in so-called corrupt practices, 
including state officials, may consider themselves legitimate entrepreneurs or leaders and 
be recognized as such in the eyes of the local com- munity. Far from being 'strongmen' 
or belonging to 'criminal gangs', they may be legitimate community leaders seeking to 
address what they see as inequities in a system which works in favour of the central 
government and its cronies. John McCarthy's (2002, 2007) work on illegal logging in 
South Aceh and Central Kalimantan, in which he begins to unpack the difference between 
legality and what he calls 'legitimacy', examines the role of local strongmen and the 
development of local extralegal systems which act to compensate for a system in which 
'state agencies working with nation wide organizational rules are often unable to 
accommodate the interests of diverse groups and the variety of variables involved in 
local settings' (McCarthy 2002:880). In the case of Aceh, McCarthy (2002:873) asserts 
that local leaders were able to claim legitimacy for many of the illegal practices he 
observed because 'outside interests and central government gain the lion's share of 
economic rents derived from legal logging concessions'. Illegal logging employs many 
people in the local community and beyond, including those in retail and service sectors as 
well as the wide network of district official raising taxes and oknum receiving payments. 
Thus, the local community benefits considerably. This dynamic, combined with other 
factors (notably, a fall in prices for other local products), produced a situation in which 
logging became legitimate. 
Similarly, in their work on logging in West Kalimantan, Reed Wadley and Michael 
Eilenberg (2005) use the term 'illegal' in inverted commas to suggest that although logging 
is seen by both the Indonesian government and the international community as an illegal 
activity, the local communities see it as a negotiated  sale of timber from their traditionally 
managed forests and thus a legitimate act. As Anne Casson and Krystof Obidzinski 
(2002:2148) argue, 'illegal' logging can be viewed as a structurally important element of 
life in rural Kalimantan, and in some cases, it is no longer considered to be 'illegal'. In 
other cases, confusion over what constitutes 'illegal logging' is further heightened as a result 
of attempts by the central and provincial governments to re-assert national laws. Whereas 
previously little attempt was made to enforce the national laws, heightened concerns by the 
central government about the practice of 'illegal' logging led to an active process of 
criminalizing such acts through arrests and court procedures (Wadley and Eilenberg 2005). 
It is no surprise then that local border communities are confused about what is considered 
legal and illegal, and have a heightened mistrust towards state laws and regulations 
(Eilenberg 2008:8). 
These examples demonstrate that the involvement of local government authorities in illegal 
practices cannot be regarded as simply a matter of entrenched nation-wide corruption that 
manifests itself at all levels of bureaucracy. Instead, we need to explore particular 
expressions of corruption and its meanings for local officials and other stakeholders. Itty 
Abraham and Willem van Schendel (2005) have used the concept of 'licitness' to take 
into account the gap between the state's understandings of criminal activity and those 
understandings deployed by individuals themselves. They call for the need to identify the 
origins of regulatory authority and distinguish between political authority (whether 
something is legal or illegal) and social authority (whether it is licit or illicit). In other 
words, to use the example of labour migration, persons involved in the management of 
cross-border flows, as well as migrants, may or may not share the state's categorization of 
their activities as criminal (Abraham and Van Schendel2005). As Horstmann and Wadley 
point out, differences between regulatory authority and social authority are accentuated in 
border zones because of the presence of dense webs of connection that link individuals 
on either side of the border - connections that prompt frequent cross-border flows of 
objects, peoples and practices (Horstmann and Wadley 2006). When this is combined 
with the vast geographical distances between the centre of state political authority 
(usually located in the nation's capital) and life in the margins, the state's categorization 
of certain kinds of cross-border movements as 'illegal', may be deemed by borderlanders 
themselves as a 'way of life'. 
We find the heuristic device of (il)legal/(il)licit also useful when describing flows whose 
trajectories extend beyond the borderlands because it allows us to challenge commonsense 
understandings of the boundaries between legal and illegal flows across international 
borders. For example, in her study of Indonesian women who migrate to Malaysia as 
undocumented domestic workers, Diana Wong (2005) argues that while the receiving state 
may view their arrival as a problem of human smuggling (an illegal activity), the majority 
of international migrants see it as a natural response to Malaysia's demand for cheap, low-
skilled labour (an activity which is perfectly licit). The fact that their work may be deemed 
'illegal' or that they enter the country as 'irregular' migrants is blamed on the Malaysian 
government' s unfair migration system. This commonsense view of the 'illegal but licit' 
nature of the presence of large numbers of 'illegal migrants' in Malaysia, is supported by 
research which shows that in situations where a high demand for labour is combined 
with a highly restrictive migration regime, there is an increased likelihood of irregular 
migration, trafficking and human rights violations (Hugo 2005; Kelly 2005; Athukorala 
2006). In these situations, there is also heightened capacity for rent-seeking on the part of 
bureaucrats and local authorities who regulate labour migration in both sending and host 
states. These practices further blur the line between the illegality and legality of state 
practices. 
Within Indonesia, migrant workers pay unofficial charges even when using official 
government channels (Hamirn 2003). In the face of the activities of state bureaucracies, 
individuals may determine that the laws governing temporary labour migration are simply 
'bad laws' (Vasquez-Leon 1999) and thus 'illegal' migration is a rational choice.21 Indeed,  
as we noted  earlier many people who leave Indonesia through the transit provinces see 
irregular labour migration as attractive precisely because of the complexity, slowness and 
high cost of government-sanctioned  processes.22  In the eyes of many of these migrants, 
as well as local bureaucrats and leaders in the transit zones, it is the national laws and 
those who create them that are corrupt. According to this view, laws to protect migrants 
appear designed to squeeze money out of poor workers who incur large debts and 
lengthy repayment schedules. This suggests that in order to understand the nature of 
state involvement in illegal practices, attention must first be given to the ways in which 
certain acts come to be identified as being illegal. In the case of Indonesia's labour 
migration program, this would require an approach that examines how a system tl1at 
has been established ostensibly to assist and protect hundreds of thousands of low-
skilled workers in fact makes criminals out of those same workers and the officials that try 
to help them. 
The case of the Riau Islands also demonstrates that in order to understand the nature of 
corruption we should not only take into account the structural factors that support (or 
inhibit) state involvement in illegal acts, but also consider the meanings attached to those 
acts by different individuals and communities. It is clear from our interviews and from 
other studies (Idrus 2008) that grey migration agents and the intending labour migrants who 
choose to use their services - and the passport bureaus that support them - believe that their 
activities are licit. But the fact that grey migration agents and aspal passport bureaus have 
formalized, and openly promote, their collaborative relationships with government agencies 
suggests that grey labour migration also has a degree of licitness for local agents of the 
state. For many of these officials, the aspal solution is a necessary and inevitable response 
to flaws in the national labour migration system.  
                                                          
21 Vrisquez-Le6n (1999:255, footnote 2) defines the informal economy 'as that part of the illegal economy 
that results in legitimate economic activities that have to be undertaken illegally because of bad state laws 
and regulations, which make them too costly if undertaken legally or make legal activity non-viable for 
many low- income entrepreneurs'. 
22 Spaan 1994; Ford 2001; Abdul Rahman 2003; Idrus 2008. McCarthy (2002:870) describes a similar 
rationale behind the actions of 'illegal' loggers - the process of obtaining legal logging papers in Aceh 
was so time consuming and complex, that local entrepreneurs would give up and provide payments to local 
officials to 'turn a blind eye'. 
Conclusion 
This discussion of the aspal system in the Riau Islands points to the complexities 
surrounding attempts to theorize the form and nature of state involvement in illegal 
activities. Disjunctures between the ways the official labour migration system is supposed 
to assist migrant workers and the reality of its impact on those workers and on 
communities create opportunities for the aspal system to emerge and flourish. The ways 
that individuals respond to the grey labour migration system - including the 'corrupt' 
practices of local government officials - reflects their understanding of a number of 
factors including the legitimacy of central government policy (and authority), the impact 
of such policy on the local community, and the saliency of local expressions of identity. 
In the case of the Riau Islands, on the whole the local community regards the aspal 
system as an inevitable outcome of the central government's failure to understand life in 
the border zone. Most local people also see the behaviour of local officials and their 
private partners in the grey migration system as a legitimate response to the flows of 
migrant workers into the islands. 
An examination of the intersections between legality and licitness in labour 
migration processes in different sites opens up possibilities for re- thinking the nature 
of state illegality, not just the dissonances between society and state. If we are to 
understand the corrupt practices of local government officials with regard to labour 
migrants passing through the transit zone we require an approach that accounts for the 
structural factors that support or inhibit corruption as well as the meanings associated 
with different forms of illegal behaviour. As the visibility and community acceptance of 
the aspal route implies, the motivations behind ostensibly very similar forms of state 
involvement in illegal practices in different sites may vary considerably. In the case of 
the Riau Islands, corrupt practices around the issuing of travel documents are in part a 
local community-sanctioned response to managing the impact and limitations of a 
central government policy that fails to take local conditions into account. Like the local 
ecologies of legitimacy that surround illegal logging in other parts of Indonesia, this case 
suggests that attention to scale is important in the study of the motivations and 
manifestations of the Indonesian state's engagement with illegality. 
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